Essays On Financial Frictions And Business Cycles by Wang, Yankun
  
 
  ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Yankun Wang 
August, 2011
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2011 Yankun Wang
  
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 
 
YANKUN WANG, Ph. D.  
Cornell University 2011 
 
In this dissertation I explore the relationship between the frictions in a country’s 
financial market and its business cycle movements. It is well known that the financial 
market is far from perfect, and shocks originating in such market could have sizable 
impact on the real economy. On the other hand, evolvement in the financial market 
could also be a reflection of the real economy. For example, economic downturn often 
leads to high borrowing cost for a country in the international financial market. The 
essays in this dissertation present an analysis of this two-way relationship, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  
The first essay studies the link between country credit spreads – defined as the 
difference between a home country’s cost of borrowing from the international credit 
market and the world riskless interest rate – and the domestic business cycle 
fluctuations. By combining both empirical and theoretical analysis, this essay shows 
that deteriorating credit markets are both reflections of a declining economy and a 
major factor that depresses economic activity. This study uses a quarterly dataset over 
the period 1972Q1 to 2010Q1 for South Korea.  
The second essay probes the importance of financial shocks in creating business 
cycles in the United States. It starts from a theoretical dynamic stochastic generating 
equilibrium model, which identifies positive financial shocks as those that drag down 
the corporate net worth while raising domestic output. An empirical analysis later uses 
this property to identify financial shocks and study their importance in creating 
 business cycle movement for the U.S. in the past fifty years. This property is in stark 
contrast to technological shocks, which raise both corporate net worth and total output.  
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation studies the two-way relation between a countrys corporate sector bor-
row costs and its business cycle movements. Macroeconomics has a long-standing tradition,
starting from Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes if not earlier authors, that emphasizes
the role of credit market conditions in the propagation of cyclical uctuations. Deteriorating
credit markets are both reections of a declining economy and a major factor that depresses
economic activity. My goal in this dissertation is to study this interaction both qualitatively
and quantitatively. Both essays in this dissertation achieve this goal, but from di¤erent
angles.
In the rst essay, I disentangle the complicated interrelations among country interest
spreads, world interest rates, terms of trade, and business cycles in a small open economy.
The key mechanism is the link between country spreads dened as the di¤erence between a
home countrys cost of borrowing abroad and the world riskless interest rate and domestic
business cycle uctuations. On the one hand, high country spreads are reections of a
declining economy; on the other hand, poor credit conditions could severely damage economic
activities. In studying this mechanism I develop both an empirical and a theoretical analyses.
I nd that U.S. interest rate shocks explain about 10 percent of the movements in aggregate
activity in South Korea during the sample period; terms of trade shocks account for about
20 percent of aggregate uctuations; and country spread shocks explain about 27 percent.
The second essay is an attempt to quantify the importance of nancial shocks in creating
business cycle movements in the United States. This is achieved in two steps. In the
rst part I embed the nancial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) into a
stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibriummodel and study the transmission of nancial
and technology shocks. It turns out that both gross domestic output and corporate net
worth increase after a positive technology shock, while a positive nancial shock could drag
down the corporate net worth but increase total output. Such properties are then used as
identication conditions in the structural vector auto-regression analysis in the second part
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the paper. It nds that technology shocks account for up to 40 percent of movements in
total output for the U.S. during the past fty years, while nancial shocks account to about
10 percent of business cycle movement.
2
Chapter 2
Country Spreads and Balance Sheets
1 Introduction
In this paper, I disentangle the complicated interrelations among country interest spreads,
world interest rates, terms of trade, and business cycles in a small open economy.
Times of high interest rates are typically associated with economic depressions while low
interest rates are associated with economic expansions. Specically, what is the relationship
between country interest spreads  dened as the di¤erence between a countrys cost of
borrowing abroad and the world riskless interest rate  and macroeconomic conditions?
This question has been studied previously. Recent examples include Eichengreen and Mody
(2000), Neumeyer and Perri (2001), Uribe and Yue (2005) and Weigel and Gemmill (2006).
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) nds that higher credit quality leads to lower spread, thus
conrms the view that market fundamentals contribute to the determination of country
spread. Weigel and Gemmill (2006) uses bond prices to investigate how the creditworthiness
of four Latin American countries is inuenced by global, regional and country specic factors.
They conclude that the credit worthiness of these four emerging markets is driven mainly
by a set of factors which are related to stock market in the region as well as in the United
States. Not much is said, however, about the fact that movements in domestic economy
may be caused partly by variation in country interest rate itself. Neumeyer and Perri (2001)
represents another extreme of the spectrum by assuming that the country spread follows an
exogenous process. They nd that interest rate is an important factor for explaining business
cycles in emerging economies.
In reality, both country spreads and the level of economic activities are endogenously de-
termined, and they closely interplay with each other. As a matter of fact, macroeconomics
has a long-standing tradition, beginning with Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes if not
earlier authors, that emphasizes the role of credit market conditions in the propagation of
cyclical uctuations. As Gertler (1988) discusses, deteriorating credit market conditions are
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both reections of a declining real economy and a major factor depressing economic activ-
ity. In particular, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) develops a nancial accelerator
property in that endogenous developments in credit markets work to propagate and amplify
shocks to the macroeconomy.
In this paper I rst follow Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) by introducing endoge-
nously determined nancial market frictions through the balance sheet e¤ects in a small open
economy DSGE model. I then validate the theoretical results from this model by comparing
them with an empirical time series econometric analysis.
The key mechanism in my theoretical analysis is the link between country spreads and
domestic business cycle uctuations. Deteriorating credit markets are both reections of a
declining economy and a major factor that depresses economic activity. Specically, I assume
that domestic entrepreneurs resort to international credit markets to cover the di¤erence
between investment needs and their net worths. In the presence of credit market frictions and
with the total amount of capital investment held constant, this model of lending with costly
state verication implies that the external nance premium, or country spread, depends
inversely on domestic entrepreneursnet worths. This inverse relationship arises naturally
because less net worth implies greater potential divergence of interests between borrowers
and creditors, leading to increased agency costs. In equilibrium, foreign creditors must be
compensated for higher agency costs by a larger premium. Since the borrowersnet worths
are usually procyclical, the external nance premium will be countercyclical, enhancing the
uctuations in business cycles.
Three kinds of shocks are considered in the theoretical analysis: shocks to credit spread,
shocks to world interest rate and shocks to country terms of trade. A positive credit spread
shock increases borrowing cost, which in turn depresses the economy, causing drop in both
gross domestic investment and output. World interest rate shocks can a¤ect the business
uctuations through two di¤erent channels. First an increase in US interest rate, which
is taken to be the world interest rate in this paper, can increase countrys borrowing cost
through the no-arbitrage condition. Second, rising world interest rate brings down country
spread. As a result, the movement of country interest rate to world rate shocks is not one-to-
one. In contrast, terms of trade shocks have direct impact on the fundamentals, thus shifting
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the country spread. Similar issues have been examined in Uribe and Yue (2006), which
also models endogenously determined country spread and aggregate output. However, their
paper uses short-run restrictions to identify world interest rate shocks and country spread
shocks, which is harder to justify compared with the identication scheme used in this paper.
Furthermore, in their paper the theoretical analysis is limited to the case in which the law
of motion of the country spread is exogenously given, and does not address why country
spread depends upon variables such as output or the world interest rate. Therefore, it lacks
microfoundation for the determination of country spread. The current paper addresses this
issue and has a microfoundation for country spread. In a sense, this paper is an extension
of Uribe and Yue (2006).
In my empirical analysis I introduce a VAR-based study of the transmission mechanism of
the shocks described above. This is achieved through analyzing a six-variable VAR system,
including total output, total investment, trade balance to output ratio, country spread,
terms of trade and world interest rate. The dataset is from South Korea, covering the
period 1972 to 2010 examined quarterly. Yielding reliable information about the transmission
mechanism requires a credible identication scheme. This is achieved in two steps. First, the
impulse responses of business cycles to terms of trade shock and world interest rate shock are
calculated without imposing any constraints other than that both terms of trade and world
interest rate are exogenous processes to the small open economy. Second, the identication
of country spread shocks is obtained by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse response
functions to a country spread shock, as in Uhlig (2005). Such sign restrictions avoid the
conventional short-run or long-run restrictions, which are usually hard to justify and subject
to debate. Applying sign restrictions to identify country spread shocks leads to more robust
results. Two kinds of results can be derived through this exercise. First are the estimated
impulse responses of all three shocks after imposing a Bayesian framework to achieve exact
identication for country spread shocks. Second is the percentage of variations in aggregate
output which could be explained by the three shocks. This measures the contribution and
relative importance of various shocks to the movement of business cycles.
All the results from the VAR analysis are then contrasted with those derived from a
DSGE model. It is shown that the impulse response functions to these shocks are broadly
5
consistent with the ndings in the empirical VAR model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical DSGE
model. Section 3 parameterizes the theoretical model and derives theoretical impulse re-
sponse functions. Section 4 introduces the empirical model and identies country spread
shocks, terms of trade shocks, and world interest rate shocks in this context. Section 5
concludes. The appendices contain detailed discussions on the dataset, the Bayesian VAR
estimation strategy, and the nancial contracting problem.
2 A Small Open Economy with Financial Accelerator
The theoretical model starts from a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model, but departs from it to include the balance sheet e¤ects. In this model there are two
types of agents in the domestic economy: risk-averse consumers, and risk-neutral consumers.
The risk-averse consumer owns both the retail rms and the wholesale good production rms,
and behaves like a typical representative household in a dynamic stochastic economy. The
risk-averse consumer chooses consumption, holds bonds and provides labor to the wholesale
rms. The risk-neutral consumer rents capital to wholesale rms, and for this reason, I call
him entrepreneurfor the rest of the paper. Entrepreneurs nance investment in excess of
their own net worth by borrowing from foreigners, and they only consume when they depart
from the scene. The product of the wholesale rm the wholesale good is transformed
into nal consumption goods by the retail rms. Adding retail rms to the model permits
us to incorporate price inertia in a tractable way by separating price setting decisions from
borrowing and lending decisions, as discussed later.
2.1 Risk-Averse Consumers
Suppose the preferences of risk-averse consumers are identical and are described by the
following function
U(Ct; Lt), (1)
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where
Ct =
h
(1   ) 1 (CH;t)
 1
 +  
1
 (CF;t)
 1

i 
 1
. (2)
In the above expression,  2 [0; 1] measures home-bias, and  measures substitutability
between domestic and foreign goods. The period utility function U(; ) is continuous and
second order di¤erentiable, and satises the following conditions: UC(; ) > 0, UCC(; ) < 0,
UL(; ) < 0, and ULL(; ) > 0.
Each risk-averse consumer works, consumes, and invests his or her savings in riskless
domestic bonds. Thus, the individual budget constraint is given by
PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t +BH;t+1 = WtLt +t + (1 + iH;t)BH;t, (3)
for t = 0; 1; 2:::, where PH;t is the price of domestic good, PF;t is the price of an imported
foreign good expressed in domestic currency, t is the prot from the retail rms, iH;t is
the interest paid on domestic bonds, and BH;t is the holding of domestic bond throughout
period t.
The optimal allocation of consumption between the domestic and imported goods is
determined by
CH;t = (1   )

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct, (4)
and
CF;t =  

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct,
where Pt 

(1   ) (PH;t)1  +  (PF;t)1 
 1
1  is the consumer price index (CPI), and
PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t = PtCt.
The risk-averse consumers choose CH;t(j) for j 2 [0; 1], CF;t, Lt and BH;t to maximize the
expected discounted utility (3) subject to budget constraint (4). Note that since I assume
all the risk-averse consumers are identical to each other, in equilibrium BH;t = 0. Solving
the risk-averse consumersproblem yields standard rst order conditions for consumption
and labor supply
UC;t = (1 + iH;t)Et

UC;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

; (5)
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and
Wt
Pt
=
 UL;t
UC;t
. (6)
2.2 Firms
Firms are owned by risk-averse consumers. At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs
purchase raw capital, convert it into usable capital, and combine it with hired labor to
produce domestic goods in such rms. The production of the rms is competitive, and uses
a constant return to scale technology
Yt = AtK

t L
1 
t , 0 <  < 1, (7)
where Yt is aggregate output of domestic goods, Kt is the aggregate usable capital input
provided by entrepreneurs in the previous period, Lt denotes labor input, and At is an
exogenous technology parameter.
The labor required in this production is supplied by the risk-averse consumers. In every
period, the representative rm maximizes prots given by
PtYt  WtLt  RtKt,
subject to the technology constraint. The solution to its problem is standard:
RtKt = PtYt; (8)
WtLt = (1  )PtYt. (9)
2.3 Risk-Neutral Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs play an important role in this model, because they nance investment partly
with loans from foreigners, and foreign borrowing is subject to nancial frictions. In principle,
many factors can contribute to imperfections in credit market, e.g., information asymmetry
or enforcement problems. In this paper, however, I follow a number of previous papers in
assuming a costly state verication(CSV) problem of the type rst analyzed by Townsend
(1979), in which lenders must pay a proportional auditing cost to observe an individual
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borrowers realized return, while the borrower observes the return for free. This formulation
allows for a simple, but natural way to introduce country spread into the model.
It is convenient to start to describe the entrepreneursbehavior at the end of period t.
At this time, the entrepreneurs have some net worth, PtNt, expressed in domestic currency,
and they have access to the world capital market. The safe world interest rate for foreign
currency, borrowed through period t+1, iF;t+1, is known at the end of period t. Let St be the
real exchange rate at period t. The e¤ective foreign interest ieF;t+1, dened as iF;t+1(St+1=St),
is the actual world interest rate in terms of domestic goods. The uctuations in the e¤ective
world interest rate is captured by assuming that its deviation from the steady-state level is
exogenously given and follows an AR(1) process
bieF;t+1 = iFbieF;t + iFt+1. (10)
This formulation is desirable because it is consistent with the specication of world interest
rate in the VAR analysis.
An entrepreneur can invest in capital for the next period, which he nances by both his
own net worth and borrowings from foreign creditors. In assembling the domestic nal goods
and imports into capital, the entrepreneur follows the following rule
KHt+1 = (1   )

PH;t
Qt
 
Kt+1, (11)
KFt+1 =  


PF;t
Qt
 
Kt+1, (12)
and
Qt =

(1   )(PH;t)1  +  (PF;t)1 
 1
1  , (13)
where Kt+1 is the capital investment in period t + 1, KHt+1 is the domestic goods used in
assembling capital Kt+1, KFt+1 is the foreign goods used in assembling capital Kt+1, and Qt
is the aggregate price index for capital. As a result, the entrepreneurs budget constraint is:
PtNt + St+1Dt+1 = QtKt+1. (14)
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The entrepreneur is risk-neutral, and chooses Dt+1 and Kt+1 to maximize his prot from
capital investment. The details of his borrowing behavior and the fundamental assumptions
justifying it can be found in Appendix C. Here, only the main aspects of his behavior are
described.
In the absence of nancial frictions, the expected yield on capital would be equal to the
e¤ective world interest rate. However, with costly state verication, this is not the case
anymore. There turns out to be a wedge between the expected return to investment and
the e¤ective world interest rate. This wedge is denoted as t, the external nance premium.
More specically,
1 + t+1 =
Et(Rt+1)
Qt
(1 + ieF;t+1)
. (15)
Appendix C shows that the risk premium can be expressed as an increasing function of the
value of investment relative to net worth. More specically,
1 + t+1 = F

QtKt+1
PtNt

. (16)
There is a disturbance term, t+1, is called country spread shock in this model. It is the
shocks to the monitoring cost in this model. The distribution of t+1, which corresponds to
country spread shock in the VAR analysis, is exogenously given.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to have nite horizons, and each entrepreneur has a constant
probability  of surviving to the next period, implying an expected lifetime of 1=(1   ).
This assumption captures the phenomenon of ongoing creation and demise of rms. I also
assume the birth rate of entrepreneurs to be such that the fraction of agents who are entre-
preneurs is constant. Entrepreneurs only consume when they die, and the composition of
their consumption is the same as the risk-averse consumers. For convenience, I also assume
that capital fully depreciates after each period. With such formulation, an entrepreneurs
net worth evolves according to
PtNt = 

RtKt   (1 + t)RtKt   (1 + ieF;t+1)(Qt 1Kt   Pt 1Nt 1)

, (17)
where (1 + t) is the deadweight loss associated with monitoring cost in the nancial
contract, and I have used the entrepreneurs budget constraint. Appendix C shows that this
monitoring cost is an increasing function of risk premium, thus 0() > 0.
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2.4 Equilibrium
To describe the dynamic general equilibrium, I now combine various sectors of this economy.
The VAR analysis has explored the e¤ects of terms of trade shocks on the domestic
economy. Terms of trade in this model can be dened as
Zt =
PH;t
PF;t
,
the ratio of export prices and import prices, both measured in domestic currency. Similar
to the empirical analysis, I stipulate that Zt follows an AR (1) process. Specically,
Zt+1 = ZZt + 
Z
t+1,
where Z is the autocorrelation of the terms of trade process as specied in the VAR system,
and Zt+1 across time are i.i.d. innovations with mean zero and standard deviation Z .
In describing the model, market clearing conditions for wholesale goods and labor have
been implicitly used, while market clearing condition for the domestic nal goods is still
left unspecied. Domestic goods may be consumed by both risk-verse consumers and risk-
neutral consumers(entrepreneurs), or used by entrepreneurs in assembling capital, or sold
to foreigners. Because I do not model the foreign sector explicitly, I simply assume that
the amount of exports, t, is a decreasing function of terms of trade.
1 Thus the market for
domestic nal goods will clear if
CH;t(j) + C
E
H;t(j) +KH;t+1(j) + (j) = Yt(j),
for j 2 [0; 1], where CEH;t(j) denotes the consumption of good j of entrepreneurs. Strictly
speaking, monitoring cost should be included into this equation. Under reasonable parame-
terization, however, this factor has no perceptible impact on the models dynamics. Thus I
omit it here.
The dynamic stochastic equilibrium is dened in the usual way after specifying stochastic
processes for , the country spread shock and i, the monetary shock. Although I have not
explicitly introduced an expression for money demand, it would be straightforward to amend
the model to include this feature.
1For the Korea data set we use, the correlation between export and terms of trade is -0.84.
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3 Endogenous Country Spread
3.1 Functional Forms and Parameter Values
In calibrating the model, the time unit is set to be one quarter. First, I add the feature of
external discount factor such that the model will be stationary for a broader set of para-
meter values. Suppose that the discount factor for risk-averse consumers depends on their
consumption and labor supply for each period but they do not internalize this fact. Or, one
can think that the discount factor depends not on the risk-averse consumers own consump-
tion and labor supply, but rather on the average per capita levels of those variables. More
specically,
t+1 = ( eCt; eLt)t; for t  0,
where eCt and eLt denote the average per capita consumption and labor supply, and in equi-
librium, eCt = Ct and eLt = Lt.
Following Mendoza (1991), I use the following functional form for risk-averse consumers
preference
U(C;L) =
[C   w 1Lw]1 
1     1,
( eC; eL) = h1 + eC   w 1eLwi 	1 ,
and set the value of the parameters at  = 2, w = 2:955 and 	1 = 0:10. The implied
subjective discount factor in the steady state is 0:962.  = 3 implies a labor supply elasticity
of 1=3. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated home goods, , is set to be 6,
implying a steady state markup of 20 percent. AR = 1, A = 1, ' = 0:3 and  = 0:35
are standard values in the business cycle literature.  is set to be 0:75, consistent with an
average period of one year between price adjustment. For the baseline calibration I assume
that export is exogenously given and remains at a constant level. To determine the exact
value of , I set the steady state bankruptcy level at 10 percent. The range of the uniform
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock to capital returns is set to be [0:2; 1:8]. These values
can be varied without a¤ecting the results too much. In other words, the formulation is
robust. The parameters  and   are both chosen to be 0:5, representing the case of no
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home bias.  and  are both 3 which is again a standard value. For the monetary policy,
 = 2, y = 0:25, and i = 0:85, which are in line with actual data. The distribution of
the terms of trade shocks and world interest rate shocks in the theoretical model follows the
estimation in the VAR analysis.
Although there is no readily available value for , I estimate it by choosing the value
which minimizes the distance between the estimated impulse response functions and the
theoretically derived ones. Those pairs of impulse responses with larger estimated standard
error are penalized more heavily in the minimization problem.
We will discuss the details of the results from the theoretical model after introducing the
empirical analysis.
4 Empirical Analysis with a VAR Model
This section presents the VAR model and identies three kinds of shocks: country spread
shocks, terms of trade shocks and world interest rate shocks. The dynamic system in the
model includes six variables: gross domestic output, gross domestic investment, trade balance
to output ratio, country spread, terms of trade and world interest rate.
The dataset used in this analysis is quarterly data over the period 1972Q1 to 2010Q1
for South Korea. Foreign economic assistance was essential to South Koreas recovery from
the Korean War in the 1950s and to Koreas economic growth in the 1960s. During the
mid-1960s, however, South Koreas economy was growing so rapidly that the United States
phased out its aid program to Korea, and assistance from the United States ended in the
early 1970s. From then on South Korea had to meet its need for investment capital on the
competitive international market and the country became increasingly integrated into the
international capital market. It is from this moment our analysis begins. Foreign loans have
played signicant role in Koreas economic development, but in the Asian nancial crisis in
the late 1990s, dollarized foreign debts greatly increased the vulnerability of the economy.
Therefore, it is of particular relevance to explore the relationship between country spreads
and business cycles for South Korea.
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4.1 Model Specications
The starting point of the structural VAR analysis is the reduced form VAR of order p and
dimension m
Yt = B1Yt 1 +B2Yt 2 + :::+BpYt p + ut, t = 1; :::; T , (22)
where Yt ism1 vector of data at time t = 1 p; :::; T ; Bt is a coe¢ cient matrix of sizemm
and ut is the one-step ahead prediction error with variance-covariance matrix . Neither
intercept nor a time trend is included since all the data to be used later is guaranteed to be
stationary and has mean zero by HP ltering.
In this paper Yt is a vector consisting of 6 variables:
Yt =
hbyt;bit; tbrt; ecst;ctott;eiF;ti0 ,
where yt denotes real gross domestic output, it denotes real gross investment, tbrt denotes
the trade balance to output ratio, cst denotes country spread, tott denotes terms of trade, iF;t
denotes world interest rate, and ut is the one period ahead prediction error with covariance
matrix 
. A hat (b) on yt, it and tott denotes the log series detrended by HP lter2. Country
spread is measured as the di¤erence between the real corporate bond rate, after adjusting for
the currency risk, and the world interest rate, which is dened as the real three-month U.S.
treasury bill rate. Output, investment and trade balance are all seasonally adjusted. I have
not included some measure of country debt into the system because adding external debt to
the GDP ratio does not improve the t of the model due to the high positive correlation of
external debt to trade balance. More details on the data are provided in Appendix C.
In estimating the VAR system, it is assumed that both tott and iF;t follow a simple
univariate AR(1) process. This assumption is reasonable because South Korea is a small
open economy3, and unlikely to have a sizable impact on the world interest rate and its own
2Some economists have argued that HP lter, while working pretty well for developped countries, is not
the most appropriate choice for developping countries. Although South Korea is an OECD country, it has
rather volatile business cycle movements. So Baxter-King band-pass lter is also applied for robustness
check. Since the results do not vary signicantly from the case of HP lter, we omit the results here.
3In year 2007, the world output is $54.62 trillion after adjustment for purchasing power parity while
South Koreas GDP is $1.206 trillion, which is about 2:21 percent of world output, according to CIA o¢ cial
statistics.
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terms of trade.
The VAR system is estimated by standard OLS technique. To choose the appropriate
lag length for the system, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is calculated4. The result
points to the choice of AR(1) specication. As a result, p is equal to 1.
4.2 Identication of External Shocks
World interest rate shocks and terms of trade shocks are external to the domestic economy,
thus the corresponding identication schemes are di¤erent from the scheme for credit spread
shocks. This subsection discusses the identication of these two external shocks.
The goal in the identication process is to decompose the prediction error ut into eco-
nomically meaningful or fundamental shocks. In the end, what interest us is examining the
impulse responses to such fundamental shocks instead of the prediction errors. Suppose there
are a total of 6 fundamental innovations which are mutually independent. Independence of
the fundamental innovations is an appealing assumption since otherwise there would remain
some unexplained causal relationship between them. To identify the fundamental shocks vt,
I assume there is a matrix A such that ut = Avt. The jth column of A then represents the
immediate impact on all the variables in the system of the jth fundamental innovation, one
standard error in size. Since both terms of trade and world interest rate have exogenous
movements, the last two elements in vt coincide with the prediction errors in the AR(1)
processes for terms of trade and world interest rate, after normalization of the variance5. As
for the credit spread shock, without loss of generality, let us assume that it resides in the
fourth position in vt. Note that there is no need to specify the rst three elements in vt,
since they are not of interest here.
4The AIC is -22.37 for the AR(1) specication, -20.69 for the AR(2) specication, and -15.60 for the
AR(3) specication.
5The correlation between the two prediction errors is 0:04. Thus it seems reasonable to assume they are
independent.
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By the specications above, matrix A takes the following form:
A =
26664
bA
e5  stot
e6  s
37775 ,
where bA is a 4 by 6 matrix, e5 is the 1 by 6 unit vector with the fth element being 1, e6 is
a 1 by 6 unit vector with the last element being 1, stot and s are the standard deviations
of terms of trade shocks, and world interest rate shocks respectively. One restriction on A
emerges from the covariance structure

 = E[utu
0
t] = AE[vtv
0
t]A
0. (23)
Simple accounting shows that there are nine degrees of freedom in specifying A6, hence
further restrictions are needed to achieve the identication of A. Usually this is done by either
(1) choosing A to be a Cholesky factor of  as in Sims (1986) or (2) separating transitory
from permanent components as in Blanchard and Quah (1986) or (3) imposing structural
relationships between the fundamental innovations and the one-step-ahead prediction errors
as in Bernanke (1986) or Sims (1986).
Here, I propose a di¤erent strategy. Because we are only interested in the last three
elements in vt, it is only necessary to identify the last three columns of A to get the impulse
responses. Due to the special structure of matrices A, the last two columns of A can be
computed easily from the following relationships:

5 =
26666666666664
stota15
stota25
stota35
stota45
s2tot
0
37777777777775
and 
6 =
26666666666664
sa16
sa26
sa36
sa46
s2
0
37777777777775
,
6Since 
 is symmetric, the covariance structure imposes (6 5)=2 = 15 conditions on the elements of A.
There are 6 4 = 24 elements of A that need to be specied. Thus we have 24  15 = 9 degrees of freedom
left. Strictly speaking, this accounting condition, proposed by Rothenberg(1971), is a necessary but not
su¢ cient condition for exact identication. Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zhua (2005) contains one such
example.
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where aij is the ith row, jth column element in A, 
5 and 
6 are the fth and sixth columns
of 
 respectively. The condence intervals can be obtained by the bootstrap method.
4.3 Identication of Country Spread Shocks
Identifying the country spread shocks is equivalent to identifying the fourth column of A.
This is done by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of output, investment,
and country spread itself in response to such a shock. As Uhlig (2005) points out, although
researchers when carrying out the VAR analysis appeal to certain informational ordering
about the arrival of shocks, they like the results to look reasonable,which amounts to
putting some sign restrictionsimplicitly. Now, by explicitly introducing sign restrictions
on impulse responses, it becomes possible to distinguish between assumptions and conditions,
thus making the VAR analysis more convincing. It is therefore desirable is to impose some
sign restrictions that are broadly acceptable while leaving the question of interest open.
Formally stated, the sign restrictions are:
Assumption 1 : A country spread shock will not cause a drop in country spread itself, and
will not cause a rise in investment, i.e., the impulse response of country spread to a
country spread shock is nonnegative, while the impulse responses of investment to a
country spread shock is nonpositive at horizon k = 0; 1; :::; K.
When imposing sign restrictions, one needs to decide for how long these sign restrictions
will hold after an initial shock. I have tried a variety of time intervals, and the results are
very robust across the di¤erent values for K. For the results presented here K is equal to 5.
Second, I adopt a Bayesian approach and supplement the identication assumption A1
by imposing a prior distribution on the coe¢ cients in the VAR system in order to tackle
the issue of nonexact identication. The Bayesian framework has the advantage of easy
interpretation for results like condence intervals. Details of this are contained in Appendix
B.
4.4 Impulse Response Functions
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With an estimated VAR system (1) and an identication strategy, we are now ready to
address the following questions. First, how do terms of trade shocks a¤ect domestic variables
and country spread? Second, how do world interest rate shocks a¤ect the macroeconomy
and the country spread? Third, what are the potential responses of macrovariables to a
country spread shock? Fourth, how important are all these shocks in explaining movements
of aggregate activity in emerging countries? I answer these questions with the help of impulse
response functions and variance decompositions.
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response functions to a unit innovation of terms of trade
in a solid line with squares. The broken lines depict two-standard-deviation bands7, which
measures the uncertainty of the calculation of impulse responses. In response to an unan-
ticipated terms of trade shock, trade balance-to-GDP ratio falls. Note that although I do
not maintain the assumption that shocks take some time to a¤ect domestic variables, the
responses of gross output and investment to a terms of trade innovation reach their peaks
after three quarters. The e¤ects on the trade balance-to-GDP ratio is relatively persistent
with a half life of about 10 quarters. Note that output rises to a terms of trade innovation,
while trade balance-to-GDP ratio falls. Comparing the relative magnitude of the responses
tells us that trade balance increases with terms of trade shocks.
Figure 2 depicts the impulse response functions of the variable in the VAR system (1) to
a one percentage innovation in world interest rate, together with the two-standard-deviation
error bands. Output and investment drop right after such a shock due to the no-arbitrage
condition and the increase in borrowing cost. The fact that country spread increases for
a considerable period of time after an unanticipated world rate shock reects the feedback
channel from business cycle variables to country spreads. Thus, other than a direct channel
that a¤ects the country spread by decreasing it, there is an indirect channel for a world
interest rate to increase the country spread through the nancial accelerating mechanism.
The net e¤ect is a prolonged rise in country spread.
Figure 3 depicts the impulse response functions of domestic variables to an innovation
in country spread, one standard deviation in size. In response to an unanticipated country
spread shock, the country spread itself increases and reaches the peak after three quarters.
7All the bands in this section are computed by the Bootstrap Method.
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Output and investment respond as one would expect. Output initially drops by 0.5 percent
and then reverts gradually to the preshock level. Investment is more volatile in comparison.
It decreases by more than three percent immediately upon the impact. The adverse spread
shock produces an expansion in trade balance, and this is reected in the fact that the
increase in trade to output ratio far exceeds the absolute value of the decrease in output.
The point estimates of the response functions of output and investment are qualitatively
similar to those associated with an innovation in world interest rate.
A remarkable feature of the impulse responses functions across these gures is the fact
that e¤ects on country spread build up in tandem with the deterioration (or improvement,
in the case of a positive terms of trade shock) of aggregate economic activities. In all three
of the gures, the maximum e¤ects on country spread occur a few quarters after the initial
impact. This shows the existence of a feedback channel from macroeconomic conditions
to borrowing cost. On the other hand, output drops by 0.5 percent after a one-standard-
deviation innovation in country spread. Thus, the relationship between borrowing cost and
business cycles is indeed two-way.
4.5 Variance Decomposition
Figure 4 depicts the variance decomposition for gross domestic output at di¤erent horizons.
Black solid line with squares shows the fraction of the variance of one-period-in-advance
forecasting errors on aggregate output explained by terms of trade shocks, world interest
rate shocks, and country spread shocks, respectively. Broken lines depict the two-standard-
deviation error bands. The solid blue lines are the same results from the theoretical analysis.
Note that as the forecasting horizon approaches innity, the decomposition of the variance
of the forecasting error coincides with the decomposition of the unconditional variance for
the gross domestic output series.
According to the estimate of the VAR system given in Equation (1), innovation in the
U.S. interest rate explains about 10 percent of movements in aggregate activity at business
cycle frequency8in South Korea during the sample period. At the same time, country spread
8Business cycle frequency is typically dened in time series of frequencies ranging from 6 quarters to 32
quarters ( Stock and Watson, 1999). For the purpose of the present discussion, I associate business-cycle
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shocks account for about 27 percent of aggregate uctuations. Thus, around 37 percent of
business cycle movements in South Korea is explained by disturbances in nancial variables.
Terms of trade shocks can explain up to 20 percent of business cycle movements.
4.6 Theoretical and Estimated Impulse Response Functions
We are now ready to generate the impulse response functions implied by the theoretical
model and compare them with those estimated for the VAR system Equation (1). Using
these predictions from theory of business cycles as a metric allows us to assess the plausi-
bility of the shocks identied in the empirical VAR analysis. If the estimated shocks imply
similar business cycle uctuations in the empirical model and in the theoretical ones, one
can concludes that according to the proposed theory, the identied shocks are plausible.
Figure 5 compares the impulse response functions to an unanticipated shock in terms
of trade. Figure 6 shows the e¤ect of a world rate shock in both empirical and theoretical
settings. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to an innovation to country spread shocks.
Overall, the model replicates the data relatively well, and most points belong to the esti-
mated two-standard-error bands from the empirical model. Therefore, the plausibility of the
empirical model is conrmed.
5 Conclusion
There is a complicated interrelation among country spreads, world interest rates and business
cycle movements in a small open economy. This paper disentangles these interconnections
by combining empirical and theoretical analyses. First it introduces a VAR-based analysis of
the transmission mechanism for shocks to terms of trade, shocks to world interest rate, and
shocks to country spread. This is achieved through analyzing a six-variable dynamic system,
including total output, total investment, trade balance-to-output ratio, country spread, terms
of trade and world interest rate for South Korea. Second, all the results of the VAR analysis
are used as a benchmark to be compared with those derived from a DSGE model with
uctuations with the variance of the forecasting error at a horizon of about ve years. This choice of 20
quarters falls in the middle of the typical window.
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nancial accelerating mechanism.
I nd that country spreads a¤ect aggregate economic activity and they respond to macro-
economic fundamentals at the same time. The world interest rate has an impact on the bor-
rowing cost not only through no-arbitrage condition but also through feedback from macro-
economic variables to country spreads. Terms of trade shocks, which have direct impact
on trade balance and output, also inuence country spread and thus a¤ect gross domestic
output even further. U.S. interest rate shocks explain about 10 percent of movements in
aggregate activity in South Korea during the sample period, terms of trade shocks accounts
for about 20 percent of aggregate uctuations, while country spread shocks explain about
27 percent of it.
Appendix A
This appendix describes the dataset used in the empirical analysis. The dataset contains
quarterly data for South Korea over the period 1972Q1 to 2010Q1, for a total of 153 quarters.
Quarterly series for GDP, total investment and trade balance are retrieved from the OECD
database.
World interest rate series is constructed by using the three-month U.S. treasury bill rate
adjusted for the U.S. ination. Terms of trade series is obtained from IMFs International
Financial Statistics as the ratio of export unit price and import unit price. Country spread is
dened as the di¤erence between the real corporate bond rates for South Korea and real world
interest rate described above. The corporate bond rate series is available from Global Finan-
cial Data, a commercial database, and listed as series InKORD. However, since the bond is
not denominated in dollars, rather in South Korean won, there exists intrinsic currency risk
in the bonds returns which is not modeled here. To extract currency risk from the corporate
bond rate, I rst estimate the percentage change on the three month average exchange rate
of South Korean won with respect to U.S. dollar as an AR(1) process. The one-period-ahead
prediction of percentage changes in exchange rates in this precess is then subtracted from the
corporate bond series to obtain the currency risk adjusted bond returns. Another option to
construct country spread for emerging economies is to use J.P.Morgans Emerging Markets
Bond Index Plus (EMBI+). However, such index only starts recording after 1994 and is only
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a terms of trade shock by structural VAR analysis. The solid line
with squares is the estimated impulse response functions, and the dotted lines are the two-standard-deviation
error bands.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a world interest rate shock by structural VAR analysis. The solid line
with squares is the estimated impulse response functions, and the dotted lines are the two-standard-deviation
error bands.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a country credit spread shock by structural VAR analysis. The solid
line with squares is the estimated impulse response functions with sign restrictions, and the dotted lines are
the two-standard-deviation error bands.
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Figure 4: Percentage of variances on forecasting errors for gross domestic output explained by terms of trade
shocks, world interest rate shocks and country spread shocks. The solid black lines are from the empirical
analysis; the solid blue lines are from the theoretical analysis. The dotted lines are 16% and 84% empirical
quantiles.
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Figure 5: Theoretical and estimated impulse response functions to a terms of trade shock. The solid line
without squares is the impulse response functions from the theoretical model. The solid line with squares
is the estimated impulse response functions from structural VAR analysis, and the dotted lines are the
two-standard-deviation error bands.
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Figure 6: Theoretical and estimated impulse response functions to a world interest rate shock. The solid line
without squares is the impulse response functions from the theoretical model. The solid line with squares
is the estimated impulse response functions from structural VAR analysis, and the dotted lines are the
two-standard-deviation error bands.
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Figure 7: Theoretical and estimated impulse response functions to a country spread shock. The solid line
without squares is the impulse response functions from the theoretical model. The solid line with squares
is the estimated impulse response functions from structural VAR analysis, and the dotted lines are the
two-standard-deviation error bands.
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available for some emerging economies. Given the openness of South Korea, corporate bond
rates are a reasonably good approximation of the borrowing rate on the international nancial
market.
Appendix B
This appendix contains details about the identication of country spread shocks using
sign restrictions.
Let a be the column in A which corresponds to the country spread shocks. The following
three lemmas proved in Uhlig (2005) are critical for identication.
Lemma 1 If a vector a 2 Rm is a column of matrix A with AA0 = , and eA eA0 = is the
Cholesky decomposition of , there is a m-dimensional vector b of unit length such that
a = eAb.
Lemma 2 Let ri(k) 2 Rm be the vector response at horizon k to the ith shock in a Cholesky
decomposition of . The impulse response ra(k) for a is then simply given by
ra(k) =
mX
i=1
birk(k).
Lemma 3 Let Et [Yt+k] Et 1 [Yt+k] be the k-period-ahead forecast revision due to the arrival
of new data at date t. The fraction a;j;k of the variance of the this forecast revision for
variable j, explained by the shock corresponding to vector a in A, is given by
a;j;k =
(ra;j(k))
2Xm
i=1
(ri;j(k))
2
,
where the index j corresponds to variable j.
The key to identifying country spread shocks lies in the identication of the vector a.
Lemma 1 provides the criterion for eligible candidates of a; Lemma 2 allows for appropriate
impulse response analysis; Lemma 3 is used to obtain variance decomposition.
Given some VAR coe¢ cient matrices B = [B01; :::; B
0
p], some variance-covariance matrix
, and some parameter K, let T (B;; K) be the set of vector aT which satises Assump-
tion 1. Because it is obtained from inequalities, this set will either be empty or contain
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many elements, which makes exact identication impossible. This problem will be solved by
adopting a Bayesian framework.
In this framework I supplement the identication assumption A1 by imposing a prior
on T (B;; K) in order to tackle the issue of nonexact identication. Let B = [B1;:::; Bp]0
and assume that the parameters (B;; bT ) are jointly drawn from a prior on Rpmm 
Pmm  Um, where Pmm is the set of all m  m positive denite matrix and Um is the
unit sphere of m dimensional vectors. More specically, I assume the prior is proportional
to a Normal-Wishart distribution in (B;) whenever the resulting impulse responses from
(B;; bT ) satises the sign restrictions, and zero elsewhere. The at prior on the unit sphere
for bT guarantees that reordering the variables and choosing a di¤erent Cholesky decompo-
sition will not yield di¤erent results.
A proper Normal-Wishart distribution is parameterized by a mean coe¢ cient matrix B
of size mp  m, a positive denite mean covariance matrix S with size m  m, a positive
denite matrix N with size mp mp, and a real number v  0 to describe the uncertainty
about (B;) around (B; S). The Normal-Wishart distribution species that  1 follows a
Wishart distribution Wm(S
 1
=v; v) with E [ 1] = S
 1
, and that the coe¢ cient matrix in
its columnwise vectorized form, vec(B), follows a Normal distribution N(vec(B);
N 1).
In this paper, I use a weak prior that N0 = 0, v0 = 0, S0 and B0 are arbitrary. If bB andb are the MLE estimates for (B;), the posterior distribution will be such that BT = bB,
ST = b, vT = T , NT = X0TXT , where XT = [X1; :::; XT ]0 and Xt = [Y 0t 1; Y 0t 2; :::Y 0t p]0.
To draw inferences from the posterior, rst take n1 draws from the Normal-Wishart pos-
terior distribution and for each of these draws, n2 draws for bT from the m dimensional
unit sphere. For each draw, I calculate the impulse responses and check whether the sign
restrictions are satised. If they are, this is a valid draw and is thus kept. Statistics of
interest such as error bands are calculated from all the draws kept. Here n1 = n2 = 1000.
Appendix C
This appendix provides a detailed analysis of the optimal nancial contract, justifying
our specication of the relation between risk premium and capital demand. The argument
outlined here closely follows Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998).
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Suppose entrepreneurs and foreign creditors are both risk-neutral, and the supply of
credit is competitive. The contracting problem happens between a single entrepreneur,
indexed by j, and foreign lenders in period t: For tractability, I consider only one period
contract. At the time of contracting, entrepreneur js net worth in nominal terms, PtNt(j),
risk-free world interest rate, iF;t+1, and price of capital Qt are all known. The wholesale
rms are competitive with constant return to scale technology, and thus earn zero prot.
The entrepreneurs income stream comes from the returns on capital. Thus the nancial
contract is based on the returns from capital. Let prots per unit capital in terms of foreign
currency be !t+1(j)(Rt+1=St+1), where St+1 is the nominal exchange rate in period t + 1,
and !t+1 is an idiosyncratic shock with E(!t+1) = 1. I assume the c.d.f. of !t+1, F (!t+1),
and the p.d.f. of !t+1, f(!t+1), are both public information, and !t+1(j) is i.i.d. across j
and t. Without causing confusion I will simply denote them as !9. For now, assume also
that period t + 1 aggregate return on capital in dollars, Rt+1=St+1, is known. Crucially, I
assume ! is unknown to both parties prior to the investment decision; however, after the
investment decision, ! is observed freely by the entrepreneur, while foreign creditors have to
pay a proportional monitoring cost !(Rt+1=St+1).
The credit contract species two functions (I(!); E(!;K)) such that if state ! is moni-
tored, I(!) = 1, otherwise I(!) = 0, and the state contingent repayment schedule E(!;K)
to the foreign creditors is nonnegative if entrepreneur rent capital K to the wholesale rm.10
For a givenK, if an entrepreneur is not monitored, he will always claim that he is in the state
! where the repayment E(!; K) is the lowest among all the states which are not monitored.
As a result, in the optimal contract, for those states which are not monitored, E(!;K) is
a constant for a given K. Let ! be the cut o¤ value such that if !  !; the entrepreneur
will not be monitored; if ! < !, monitoring will occur. The constant repayment E(!;K)
when !  ! is equal to the total return of capital at state !, !(Rt+1=St+1)Kt+1. When a
monitoring cost is incurred, the entrepreneur receives nothing, while the foreign creditors
receive (1  )!(Rt+1=St+1)Kt+1 in residual claims net of monitoring costs.11
9I do not specify the exact sources of the idiocyncratic shocks. They could come from various sources,
but the comined e¤ect is to vary the return to capital.
10The index j is suppressed.
11See Williamson (1987) for a detailed analysis.
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To provide enough incentive for the foreign creditors to participate in such a contract, it
must be the case that
[!(1  F (!)) + (1  )
Z !
0
!f(!)d!](Rt+1=St+1)Kt+1 (A1)
= (1 + iF;t+1)Dt+1
= (1 + iF;t+1)(QtKt+1   PtNt)=St,
where the second equality follows from the fact that the loan must equal the di¤erence
between capital investment and the entrepreneurs net worth.
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), I dene  (!) as the expected gross
share of capital returns going to the lender:
 (!) 
Z !
!a
!f(!)d! + !
Z !b
!
f(!)d!,
where (!a; !b) is the support of !. Similarly, lets dene G(!) as the expected monitoring
costs
G(!)  
Z !
!a
!f(!)d!.
If the hazard rate h(!), f(!)=[1  F (!)], satises the condition that !h(!) is increasing in
!, one can easily prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4 There exists a ! 2 (!a; !b) such that
(i)  0(!)  G0(!) < 0 for ! > !;
(i)  0(!)  G0(!) = 0 for ! = !;
(i)  0(!)  G0(!) > 0 for ! < !.
Note that lim!!!a  (!) G(!) = 0, lim!!!b  (!) G(!) = 1 . Since  (!) G(!)
is increasing on (!a; !) and decreasing on (!; !b), the optimal contract will always choose
! < !.
Formally the optimal contract problem is:
max
Kt+1,!
(1   (!))(Rt+1=St+1)Kt+1
s:t: [ (!)  G(!)](Rt+1=St+1)Kt+1 = (1 + iF;t+1)(QtKt+1   PtNt)=St.
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To simplify, lets rst dene the premium on external funds as
1 + t+1 =
Rt+1St
QtSt+1(1 + iF;t+1)
and dene the capital/net worth ratio as
t =
QtKt+1
PtNt
.
The contracting problem can be rewritten as
max
t,!
(1   (!))t
s:t: [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)t = t   1.
Dene  as the Lagrangian multiplier on the lendersparticipation constraint, the rst order
conditions for an interior solution to this problem can be written as:
!:  0(!)  [ 0(!)  G0(!)] = 0; (A2)
t: [1   (!)] + [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)   = 0; (A3)
: [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)t = t   1: (A4)
Note that (A2) and (A3) imply that the optimal cuto¤ depends only on the external
nance premium (1 + t+1), and thus is independent of the entrepreneurs net worth.
Combining (A2) and (A3) one can derive ! as a function of the external nance premium
from the following equation
[1   (!)] +

 0(!)
 0(!)  G0(!)

[ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1) 

 0(!)
 0(!)  G0(!)

= 0.
Under the maintained assumption that !h(!) is increasing in !, Implicit Function Theorem
can be applied to prove the following results.
Lemma 5 (i) The optimal cuto¤ ! is an increasing function of (1+t+1), the risk premium,
or, expressed in inverse form,
1 + t+1 = (!) with 
0() > 0.
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(ii) The ratio of investment relative to net worth, t, is an increasing function of risk
premium 1 + t+1.
1 + t+1 = F (t) with F
0() > 0.
For completeness, lets include an expression for t after solving !:
t =
1
1  [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)
:
So far I take the aggregate return per capital (Rt+1=St+1) as given in the partial equi-
librium analysis. If (Rt+1=St+1) is uncertain at the time of contracting, the preceding analysis
survives intact with (Rt+1=St+1) replaced with its expectation at time t.12
Appendix D
This section provides an analytic expression for  (!) and  (!)   G(!) where ! has a
uniform distribution over [a; b] with E(!) = 1, which is the specication I use in calibrating
the theoretical model. Note that !h(!) is increasing in ! for uniform distribution. Since
F (!) =
!   !a
!b   !a , f(!) =
1
!b   !a ,
one can derive that
 (!) =
1
!b   !a

 !
2
2
+ !!b   !
2
a
2

, and
G(!) =
1
!b   !a

!2
2

.
12Appendix A in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) has detailed derivation.
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Chapter 3
Financial Shocks and Business Cycles
6 Introduction
Technology shocks have been well studied in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) literature in creating business cycles. Other shocks, such as monetary shocks and
preference shocks, are later introduced into the literature. However, the recent nancial
crisis, also dubbed the Great Recession, urges us to think the following question: could
shocks originating in the nancial markets play a signicant role in creating the business
cycle movements? Economists are used to studying shocks originating from the real side of
the economy, but it is hard to convince ourselves that the recent economic downturn, which
o¢ cially started from Fall, 2008, was actually caused by shocks from the real side; rather,
it seems that it has its roots in the nancial markets. This motivates me to explore the
importance of nancial shocks, together with technology shocks, in creating macroeconomy
uctuations. I start from a standard DSGE model, then use the dening characteristics
found in the model to identify both nancial and technology shocks in a structural vector
auto-regression (VAR) analysis for the U.S.
In the early literature of real business cycles, there usually exists just one representative
household. As a result, actual nancial ows do not occur in the equilibrium and nancial
structures do not matter. On the other hand, Macroeconomics has a long-standing tradition
of emphasizing the role of credit market conditions in the propagation of cyclical uctua-
tions. There exists a two-way interaction between the development inn the credit market
and that in the real economy: deteriorating credit market conditions are both reections
of a declining real economy and a major factor depressing economic activity. Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)13 is one of the early attempts to develop a nancial accelera-
torproperty in DSGE models such that endogenous developments in credit markets work
to propagate and amplify shocks to the macroeconomy. This is framework I adopt in the
13Henceforth BGG (1999).
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theoretical model. However, BGG (1999) focuses on studying the transmission of technology
and monetary policy shocks, while here I study nancial shocks.
In this paper I follow BGG (1999) by studying endogenously determined credit market
frictions through the balance sheet e¤ects, while introducing an external nancial market
which allows nancial shocks to be dened in a simple and tractable way. The key mecha-
nism involves the link between external nance premium, dened as the di¤erence between
marginal productivity of capital and riskless rate, and the corporate net worth in a closed
economy. Specically, I assume entrepreneurs, the capital providers, have to resort to banks
to cover the di¤erence between investment and their net worth. With credit market frictions
present, and with the total amount of capital investment held constant, standard model
of lending with costly state verication implies that the external nance premium depends
inversely on entrepreneursnet worth. This inverse relationship arises naturally because less
net worth implies greater potential divergence of interests between borrowers and creditors,
thus increased agency cost. In equilibrium, banks as creditors must be compensated for
higher agency cost by a larger premium. As a result, a positive nancial shock which in-
creases banksprots in the external nancial market, increases credit ows and requires less
net worth as collateral, thus a decrease in borrowersnet worth. This is in sharp contrast
with the e¤ects of technology shocks. Although a positive technology shock also increases
credit ows, the agency cost is mitigated by the increase in productivity and as a result,
external nance premium falls and entrepreneursnet worth increases.
To determine the relative contribution of nancial and technology shocks in creating
business cycle movements in the U.S., I adopt the methodology used in Uhlig (2005) to
identify these shocks using sigh restrictions in a structural VAR analysis. Specically, a
positive nancial shock is identied through the requirement that for the rst 10 periods,
such shocks must increase output and decrease corporate net worth. In other words, if a
shock has such e¤ects for the rst 10 periods after its occurrence, we call it a positive nancial
shock. While a positive technology shock is a shock such that both total output and corporate
net worth increase for the rst 10 periods. The data set I use includes output, investment,
loans made to nonfarm corporate from commercial banks, net worth of nonfarm nonnancial
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corporate, and credit spread14 for U.S. from 1957Q1 to 2009Q2. The results nd that
although technology shocks contribute about 40 percent of the business cycle uctuations,
nancial shocks can still explain about 10 percent of variation in such movements.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7 presents the model economy. Section 8
discusses calibration and the transmission mechanism of the model. Section 9 contains the
structural VAR analysis. Section 10 concludes.
7 The Model
The model features a nancial accelerator in the general framework of a DSGE model. It is
a real model, and is kept deliberately simple without monopolistic competition and nominal
rigidities since the focus here is on the corporate net worth and external nance premium.
The way I model the nancial accelerator largely follows BGG. However, to their exposition
a few new features are added that allow the nancial shocks to be introduced into the model
in a meaningful way.
The model distinguishes households, entrepreneurs, rms and banks in a closed economy.
Households are innitely lived and make intertemporal as well as intratemporal decisions
over consumption and labor supply. Entrepreneurs borrow from the banking sector, produce
usable capital and rent it to rms. Firms operate on competitive markets and choose the
optimal levels of capital and labor for production. Banks supply credit in a competitive
market to the entrepreneurs, pay back interest on householdsdeposits, and invest in an
outside nancial market whose details are not explicitly modeled in this paper. A negative
shock to the return from the investment in the outside market will force the banks to increase
the rates charged on loans, and I call such a shock a nancial shock, or more specically, a
banking capital shock.15
The key for the working of the nancial accelerator lies in the entrepreneur sector. First
of all, since entrepreneurs are di¤erent from households, the model does not collapse into
a representative agent framework, and there is nontrivial borrowing and lending in equi-
14Credit spread is dened as the di¤erence between prime loan rate and Fed Funds rate in the data.
15We could also think of this as a positive productivity shock to the banking sector.
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librium. Financial frictions arise from asymmetric information in the relationship between
borrowers, the entrepreneurs, and lenders, the banks. It is assumed that the lenders must
pay a positive monitoring cost to observe the true performance in the borrowersproduction
of usable capital. The optimal nancial contracts thus dictates that lenders will only incur
this monitoring cost when the borrowers declare bankruptcy, in which case the banks seize
everything net from monitoring cost from the entrepreneursprot for the period. Note that
monitoring cost in the model should be interpreted in more general terms as proxying for all
kinds of expenses associated with debtor bankruptcy, such as accounting and legal expenses
or liquidation losses. Such friction of costly state verication causes loans to be charged at
a premium over the risk-free interest rate and give an important role to borrowersbalance
sheets. Existing literature emphasizes the countercyclical behavior of the nancial premium
originated from the balance sheet e¤ects, usually triggered by a productivity shock or a
monetary policy shock. In this paper, however, increasing risk premium is not necessarily
the passive reection of declining real economy: even if the real economy is in perfectly
healthy condition, a contractionary nancial shock, or more specically, a negative shock to
banking capital, or a sudden increase in bankruptcy cost, could cause change in net worth
and external nancing premium.
One of the goals of this paper is to rigorously assess the quantitative importance of this
mechanism. To do so, we now describe the objectives and constraints of agents in this model
in more detail.
7.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of unit mass. Households are innitely-lived agents with
an identical utility function which is additively separable in consumption, Ct, and labor, Ht,
i.e. X1
=0
Et[
1
1   (Ct+ )
1    1
1 + 
(Ht+ )
1+,
where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective intertemporal discount factor,  1 is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, and  1 is the elasticity of labor supply. Households choose the
appropriate level of consumption and labor supply to optimize this utility function, while
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the ow budge constraint holds with equality and householdswealth accumulation satises
the transversality condition.
Householdsincome comes from supplying labor to rms at competitive real wages, Wt,
from the ownership of the competitive rms which rebate their prots t to households
every period, and from interests earned on their one-period nominal deposits in the banking
system, Bt. Wish this disposable income, households nance their consumption, Ct, and
open new deposits, Bt+1. Accordingly, the households sequence of budget constraints is
described by:
Ct +Bt+1 = WtHt + (1 + r
B
t )Bt,
where rBt is the short-term interest rate o¤ered to the depositors.
Households optimization yields the standard rst-order conditions for consumption-
savings and labor supply.
1
1 + rBt+1
= Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
 #
,
Wt = H

t C

t ,
plus the appropriate no-Ponzi scheme condition.
7.2 Production
There is a continuum of mass one of perfectly competitive rms. Firms combine capital
rented from the entrepreneurs with the labor provided by the households to produce the
only good in this economy, according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology, i.e.,
Yt = F (Kt; Lt)  etKt L1 t ,
where Yt is the output of this good, Kt is the capital rented by rms, and Lt is the labor
demanded. The productivity shock, at, follows an AR(1) process of the following form
at = aat 1 + 
a
t ,
where at is a zero mean, and serially uncorrelated innovation. The parameter 0 < a < 1
determines the persistence of the productivity shock, and 2a > 0 is the volatility of its
innovation.
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Firms maximize their static prot, i.e.,
t = Yt   (1 + rFt )Kt  WtHt,
subject to the technological constraint above, where 1 + rFt is the nominal price per unit
of capital rented from the entrepreneurs. The optimization of rms results in the following
well-known rules,
1 + rFt = FK(Kt; Lt),
Wt = FL(Kt; Lt).
Firms make zero prots in every period (i.e.,t = 0), and the households who own them do
not receive any dividends.
7.3 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneur sector, in which the nancial accelerator originates and external nance
premium is determined, is the most important sector in this model. Entrepreneurs nance
the capital they rent to rms partly with loans from banks, and such loans are subject
to nancial frictions. In principle, many factors can contribute to imperfections in credit
market, e.g., information asymmetry or enforcement problems. In this paper, however, I
follow the trend after Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) in assuming a costly state
verication(CSV) problem of the type rst analyzed by Townsend (1979), in which lenders
must pay a proportional auditing costto observe an individual borrowers realized return,
while the borrower observe the return for free. This formulation allows for a simple, but
natural way to introduce external nance premium and net worth into the model.
Suppose there is a continuum of entrepreneurs over a total mass of 1. It is convenient
to start to describe a representative entrepreneurs behavior at the end of period t. At that
time, the entrepreneur has some net worth, Nt, and has access to external ndings from
banks. Let Dt denote the amount of loan the entrepreneur borrows. The total amount of
capital the entrepreneur could potentially invest in period t+ 1 is dened by
Kt+1 = Nt +Dt+1.
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However, the entrepreneur can not rent this amount directly to the rms. He has to
apply a linear technology, which is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, !, to convert the
capital dened above as usable capital. This usable capital can then be rented directly to
rms. Specically, this linear technology is !Kt+1, where the p.d.f. of ! follows f(!) s
Uniform(!a; !b) and E(!) = 1. Note that ! is unknown to both the entrepreneur and the
lender prior to the investment decisions. After the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, the
lender only observe ! by paying a proportionate monitoring cost, !(1+ rFt )Kt+1. For now,
assume that period t+1 aggregate return on capital, 1+ rFt , is known. Lenders are assumed
to be competitive nancial intermediaries who earn zero prots in equilibrium and are able
to diversify away idiosyncratic credit risk.
The credit contract species two functions (I(!); E(!;K)) such that if state ! is moni-
tored, I(!) = 1, otherwise I(!) = 0, and the state contingent repayment schedule E(!;K)
to the creditors is nonnegative if entrepreneur rent capital K to the wholesale rm.16 For a
given K, if an entrepreneur is not monitored, he will always claim that he is in the state !
where the repayment E(!; K) is the lowest among all the states which are not monitored.
As a result, in the optimal contract, for those states which are not monitored, E(!;K) is a
constant for a given K. Let ! be the cut o¤ value such that if !  !; the borrower will not
be monitored; if ! < !, the borrower will declare bankruptcy and monitoring will occur.17
The constant repayment E(!;K) when !  ! is equal to the total return of capital at state
!, !(1 + rFt+1)Kt+1. When monitoring cost is incurred, the entrepreneur receives nothing,
while the creditors receive (1 )!(1+rFt+1)Kt+1 in residual claims net of monitoring costs.18
To provide enough incentives for the banks to participate in such a contract, it must
be the case that banks prot could cover its cost within the same period. I assume banks
prots come from two sources: providing loans to entrepreneurs and investing in an outside
nancial market. Specically, each period banks allocate a certain amount of funds, equal
to proportion s of the loans made, and invest it in a nancial market whose details are not
explicitly modeled. The only assumption about this market is that its gross rate of return
16The index j is suppressed.
17Strictly speaking, ! takes di¤erent values for each time period t. For notational convenience, here I
write ! instead of !t, ! instead of !t, when ambiguity does not arise.
18See Williamson (1987) for a detailed analysis.
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during period t+ 1, denoted as t+1, is exogenously given and follows an AR(1) process
t+1    = (t   ) + t+1,
where  is the mean of the process t,  measures the persistence of t, and 

t is a white
noise process with variance 2. This assumption allows me to capture the phenomenon of
deleveraging in a tractable way and t , shocks to the exogenous nancial market returns,
become shocks to banking capital. Such shocks originate from the nancial market, yet has
real impact on the business cycle variables through the bankslending channel, and in this
sense, I also call them nancial shocks.19
The participation constraint for the banking sector becomes:
[!(1  F!(!)) + (1  )
Z !
0
!f(!)d!])(1 + rFt+1)Kt+1 + t+1(sDt+1) (A1)
= (1 + rBt+1)Bt+1,
where F! is the c.d.f. of the idiosyncratic shock !, and Bt+1 is the total deposit from
households over period t+ 1.
Following BGG (1999), we dene  (!) as the expected gross share of capital returns
going to the lender plus the monitoring cost:
 (!) 
Z !
!a
!f(!)d! + !
Z !b
!
f(!)d!,
where (!a; !b) is the support of !. Similarly, lets dene G(!) as the expected monitoring
costs
G(!)  
Z !
!a
!f(!)d!.
If the hazard rate h(!), f(!)=[1  F (!)], satises the condition that !h(!) is increasing in
!, we can easily prove the following lemma:
19The assumption that banks investment in the external nancial market is proportional to the credit
provided to entrepreneurs is made to avoid modeling banks portfolio choice problem. In real data the
correlation of other investment and corporate loans at U.S. commercial banks is slightly positive after HP
ltering at quarterly frequency.
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Lemma 6 There exists a ! 2 (!a; !b) such that
(i)  0(!)  G0(!) < 0 for ! > !;
(ii)  0(!)  G0(!) = 0 for ! = !;
(iii)  0(!)  G0(!) > 0 for ! < !.
Note that lim!!!a  (!) G(!) = 0, lim!!!b  (!) G(!) = 1 . Since  (!) G(!)
is increasing on (!a; !) and decreasing on (!; !b), the optimal contract will always choose
! < !. This guarantees that the optimization problem is well-dened.
Formally we can state the optimal contract problem as:
max
Kt+1,!
(1   (!))(1 + rFt+1)Kt+1
s:t: [ (!)  G(!)](1 + rFt+1)Kt+1 + t+1(sDt+1) = (1 + rBt+1)(1 + s)Dt+1,
where the credit market clearing condition Bt = (1 + s)Dt is used.
To simplify, lets rst dene the premium on external funds as
1 + t+1 =
1 + rFt+1
(1 + rBt+1)(1 + s)  t+1s
.
Note that when dening the same concept in BGG (1999), the denominator is 1 + rBt+1,
instead of (1 + rBt+1)(1 + s)   t+1s. This adjust by t+1 reects the introduction of the
external nancial market. If the gross return from this market is larger that the deposit
return, the denominator as the reserved return for banks, will be lower than the deposit
return, since banks only want to break even, and this is made easier by high prots obtained
from the nancial market. Similarly, if t drops signicantly or even become negative, banks
reserve return will become very high, possibly much higher than the deposit return.
If we dene the capital/net worth ratio as
t =
Kt+1
Nt
,
the contracting problem can be rewritten as
max
t,!
(1   (!))t
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s:t: [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)t = t   1.
Dene t as the Lagrangian multiplier on the lendersparticipation constraint, and Lt the
Lagrangian for this problem, the following optimality conditions are obtained:
@Lt
@!
:  0(!)  [ 0(!)  G0(!)] = 0; (A2)
@Lt
@t
: [1   (!)] + [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)   = 0; (A3)
@Lt
@t
: [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)t = t   1: (A4)
Note that (A.2) and (A.3) imply that the optimal cuto¤ depends only on the external
nance premium (1 + t+1), thus is independent of entrepreneurs net worth.
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) we can derive ! as a function of 1 + t+1 from the following
equation
[1   (!)] +

 0(!)
 0(!)  G0(!)

[ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1) 

 0(!)
 0(!)  G0(!)

= 0.
Under the maintained assumption that !h(!) is increasing in !, Implicit Function Theorem
can be applied to prove the following results.
Lemma 7 (i) The optimal cuto¤ ! is an increasing function of (1+t+1), the risk premium,
or, expressed in inverse form,
1 + t+1 = (!) with 
0() > 0.
(ii) The ratio of investment relative to net worth, t, is an increasing function of risk
premium 1 + t+1.
1 + t+1 = (t) with 
0() > 0.
For completeness, lets include an expression for t after solving !:
t =
1
1  [ (!)  G(!)](1 + t+1)
:
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Although dening the variable 1 + t+1 greatly simplies this problem and leads to a
better understanding of the underlying mechanism of the model, it is not the "credit spread"
dened in the usual sense. Furthermore, the marginal productivity of capital in the denition
of 1 + t+1 is unobservable. This motivates us to dene an other premium, which I call
"credit spread", as the di¤erence between entrepreneurse¤ective borrowing rate and the
riskless deposit rate, as in Woodford and Curdia (2009). For a representative entrepreneur,
with probability Fe(!), he declares bankruptcy and does not pay back to the banks; with
probability 1  Fe(!), he pays a certain proportion of his total prot, !(1 + rFt+1)Kt+1 back
to the banks. As a result, the e¤ective borrowing rate for the entrepreneur is
(1  Fe(!))!(1 + rFt+1)Kt+1
Dt
= (1  Fe(!))!(1 + rFt+1)t.
Thus the credit spread 1 + cs is
1 + cs =
(1  Fe(!))!(1 + rFt+1)t
1 + rBt+1
.
As we have stated before, 1 + t+1 is always an increasing function of !, thus an
increasing function of t. However, this is not the case for 1 + cs. For xed levels of r
F
t+1
and rBt+1, it can be proved that 1+ cs is an increasing function of both ! and t if ! follows
a Uniform distribution; although this not true for a general distribution of !. With the
movement in rFt+1 and r
B
t+1, the relationship between 1 + cs and ! becomes ambiguous.
So far we take the aggregate return per capital (1+rFt+1) as given in the partial equilibrium
analysis. If (1+ rFt+1) is uncertain at the time of contracting, the preceding analysis survives
intact with (1 + rFt+1) replaced with its expectation at time t.
20
Entrepreneurs have a nite horizon with a constant probability  of surviving to the next
period, and they only consume when they die. This assumption is made to capture the
phenomenon of ongoing births and deaths of rms, and to guarantee that they will always
remain dependent on external funds. I also assume that the birth rate of entrepreneurs to
be such that the total mass of entrepreneurs is always 1. Also, capital fully depreciates after
each period. With such formulation, an entrepreneurs net worth Nt evolves according to
Nt = 

(1   (!))(1 + rFt+1)Kt+1

.
20Appendix A in BGG (1999) has detailed derivation.
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7.4 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The labor market clears if Ht = Lt. Likewise, credit market clears if the total amount of de-
posits, Bt+1, meets the demands for loans supplies and external nancial market investment,
Bt+1 = Dt+1 + sDt+1.
The good market clearing condition is
Ct + G(!t 1)(1 + rFt )Kt + (1  )

(1   (!t 1))(1 + rFt )Kt

= Yt,
where the second and third component on the left hand side are the monitoring cost and
entrepreneursconsumption respectively. The dynamic stochastic equilibrium is dened in
the usual way for the specied distributions of the exogenous processes fatg and ftg.
8 Transmission of Shocks in the Model
8.1 Functional Forms and Parameter Values
In calibrating the model, the time unit is meant to be one quarter. The subject discount fac-
tor is chosen to be 0.988;  is set to be 1, implying the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is also 1. Similarly, both  and the elasticity of labor supply are 1. , measuring the share
of capital income on rms total prot, is set to be 0.42. Technology process has AR(1)
coe¢ cient of 0.9, as standard in the literature, and the standard deviation of technology
shocks is 0:007
1  .
It is less straightforward to choose the values for parameters in the debt contract problem.
Parameter , captures the ongoing birth and depth of rms, and coe¢ cient , measuring
bankruptcy cost, can not be directly estimated from available data. However, their values
could be pinned down from the steady state level of capital/net worth ratio, which is around
2 for U.S. during the sample period, and the bankruptcy rate in U.S., which is around 3
percent per quarter, or 12 percent annually. The implied value of  is around 0.87, while the
implied level  is around 7.5%. The idiosyncratic shock ! follows a uniform distribution on
[!a; !b], where !a = 0:45 while !b = 1:55. The results turn out to be pretty robust to the
choice in these parameters.
46
The introduction of the external nancial markets requires us to determine the value of
s, measure the ratio of total investment in the external nancial market and total amount
of loans. The average level of total investment for U.S. commercial banks during the sample
period is about 532 billions, while the total amount loans made from commercial banks for
the same period is around 473 billions. Thus s is set to be the ratio of the two, around
1.12. The mean level of return from the external market is chosen to be 1.08, with AR(1)
coe¢ cient of 0.8. The standard deviation of nancial shocks is 0.02.
8.2 Theoretical Impulse Response Functions
The transmission mechanism of technology and nancial shocks are illustrated in the follow-
ing gures.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 are the impulse responses of variables in the model with respect with
a positive technology shock, one standard deviation in size. Since capital fully depreciates in
this model, the variable k measuring capital is the same as investment here. In response to
a positive tech shock, output, consumption and investment all increase by about the same
magnitude. The same could be said for credit ows. As I have discussed before in the model
specication, the default probability, determined by !, the external nance premium, , and
the capital/net worth ratio , always move in the same direction. After the technology shock,
the default risk rst decreases since entrepreneurs are able to collect more rents from capital
if productivity of rms increases, holding everything else constant. After a few periods,
however, the other channel of increased agency cost begins to dominate due to the increased
credit ows, which brings external nance premium even higher than the level before the
shock. Entrepreneursnet worth, due to the dominant e¤ect of increased productivity, is
always increasing.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 are the impulse responses to a positive nancial shock. A sudden
increase in the return from the outside nancial market for the banks implies better credit
conditions for borrowers. As in the case of technology shocks, output, consumption and
investment all go up, although investment does so by a larger magnitude than the other two.
Unlike the case of technology shocks, however, default probability, external nance premium
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions after a positive technology shock. Each panel depicts the movement
of one variable in the model after such a shock. w represents wages, d measures capital ows, c measurs
consumption, y measures output, k measures investment, while lambda measures capital/net worth ratio.
and capital/net worth ratio all shoot up in this case, since the increase in debt ows without
any improvement in productivity raises the concern on default. Note that entrepreneurs
net worth decreases in this case, which could be explained from two di¤erent perspectives.
On the one hand, net worth is used by entrepreneurs as collateral in this model. When
the credit conditions is more relaxed, less collateral, thus less net worth is needed. On the
other hand, net worth is solely determined by the rent income collected by entrepreneurs.
If capital supplied is increase, holding everything else constant, the marginal productivity
of capital must fall. This property of decreasing net worth while increasing output becomes
the dening characteristics of nancial shocks.
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions after a positive technology shock. Here rho represents external nance
premium, omega represents the cuto¤ level of the idiosyncratic technology, n measures corporate net worth,
while a measures technology.
9 Structural VAR Analysis
The key question in this chapter is the relative contribution of productivity and nancial
shocks in business cycle movement. Figure 12, 13 and 14 juxtapose movements in the net
worth of nonfarm nonnancial corporate business in U.S. from 1957Q1 to 2009 Q2 with
the business cycle movements of GDP, gross private investment and nonnancial corporate
loans, respectively. It is well-known that both investment and credit ows are procyclical.
However, it is surprising to see how strongly procyclical net worth is after keeping only the
movement within business cycle frequencies. Figure 15 depicts the credit spread, dened as
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions after a positive nancial shock. Each panel depicts the movement
of one variable in the model after such a shock. w represents wages, d measures capital ows, c measurs
consumption, y measures output, k measures investment, while lambda measures capital/net worth ratio.
the di¤erence between prime loan rate and Fed Funds rate, together with the ltered GDP
for U.S. Although the credit spread becomes very at in recent years, over the whole sample
period it is counter-cyclical. Simply looking at these graphs would suggest that a shock
which changes output and net worth in the same direction, such as a technology shock, will
play a dominant role in creating business cycle movements.
However, such eyeball econometrics could be potentially deceptive: many things are going
on simultaneously in the economy, and one must be careful when making claims based on
simple correlation. Thus, in the rest of this section I will follow the lead of Sims (1972,
1980) and proceed to analyze the key question with the aid of vector autoregression. In
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions after a positive nancial shock. Here rho represents external nance
premium, omega represents the cuto¤ level of the idiosyncratic technology, n measures corporate net worth,
while a measures technology.
particular, I adopt the methodology in Uhlig (2005) and others and use sign restrictions in
the identication of structural shocks.
9.1 Data
The data set includes ve time series, output, investment, amount of loans, corporate net
worth and credit spread for U.S. over the sample period of 1957Q1 to 2009Q2. The output
and investment data are downloaded from BEA and adjust by GDP deator. The loan data
are quarter commercial and industrial loans from all commercial banks for U.S., downloaded
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Figure 12: This gure contrasts movements in GDP and corporate net worth after HP ltering.
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Figure 13: This gure contrasts movements in investment and corporate net worth after HP ltering.
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Figure 14: This gure contrasts movements in corporate loans and net worth after HP ltering.
from FED. Net worth series is series FL102090115 from Fed Flow of Funds which measures
net worth at historical cost of U.S. nonfarm nonnancial corporate balance sheet. All the
series are seasonally adjusted, and HP ltered after taking logs. Credit spread is dened as
the di¤erence between quarterly bank prime lending rate from Fed and the Fed Funds Rate.
9.2 The Method
The method presented here closely follows Uhlig (2005). The starting point is the reduced
form VAR of order(p) and dimension m
Yt = B1Yt 1 +B2Yt 2 + :::+BpYt p + ut, t = 1; :::; T ,
where Yt ism1 vector of data at date t = 1 p; :::; T ; Bt is a coe¢ cient matrix of sizemm
and ut is the one-step ahead prediction error with variance-covariance matrix . Neither
intercept nor a time trend is included since all the data to be used later is guaranteed to be
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Figure 15: This gure contrasts movements in GDP and credit spread after HP ltering.
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stationary and has mean zero by HP ltering.
Although it is standard to estimate such a system, what usually interest people are not
the prediction errors ut, but rather some more fundamental shocks with economic meaning
in them. Suppose that there are a total of m fundamental innovations, which are mutually
independent and normalized to be of variance 1: they can be written as a vector vt of
size m  1 with E[vtv0t] = Im. It is reasonable to assume that the fundamental shocks
are independent since otherwise there would remain some unexplained causal relationship
among them. In particular, assume that ut and vt are related through a matrix A such
that ut = Avt. Thus the jth column of A is the immediate impact of the jth fundamental
innovation on all variables, one standard error in size and in the positive direction. So far
the only restriction of A comes from the covariance condition
 = E[utu
0
t] = AE[vtv
0
t]A
0 = AA0.
Simple accounting shows that there are m(m   1)=2 degrees of freedom in specifying A,
hence further restrictions have to be imposed to achieve identication. 21Usually this is
done through either (1): choosing A to be a Cholesky factor of  as in Sims (1986); (2).
separating transitory from permanent components as in Blanchard and Quah (1986), or
(3). imposing structural relationships between the fundamental innovations and the one-step
ahead prediction errors as in Bernanke (1986) or Sims (1986). Here I proceed di¤erently. Note
that I am only interested in identifying technology shocks and nancial shocks, which move
output in the same direction while moving net worth in the opposite direction. Therefore,
there is no reason to identify all the m fundamental innovations. Also, given that the
characteristics of the shocks to be identied are given in the form of sign restrictions on
impulse responses, it is natural to start from sign restrictions for identication.
The following three results, stated and proved in Uhlig (2005), turns out to be very useful
21Strictly speaking, this accounting condition, proposed by Rothenberg(1971), is a necessary but not a
su¢ cient condition for exact identication. Unless the model is recursive system, it may not be identied
even if there are n(n   1)=2 linear restrictions. Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zhua (2005) contains one
such example. Their paper also presents an algorithm which is based on Uhlig (2005) but more e¢ cient,
especially for large VAR systems. However, for ease of presentation, I sitll use Uhligs algorithm here. Also,
since the model is relatively small, computational cost is not a big issue here.
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for the identication.
Lemma 8 If a vector a 2 Rm is a column of matrix A with AA0 = , and eA eA0 = is the
Cholesky decomposition of , there is a m-dimensional vector b of unit length such that
a = eAb.
Lemma 9 Let ri(k) 2 Rm be the vector response at horizon k to the ith shock in a Cholesky
decomposition of . The impulse response ra(k) for a is then simply given by
ra(k) =
mX
i=1
birk(k).
Lemma 10 Let Et [Yt+k] Et 1 [Yt+k] be the k-step ahead forecast revision due to the arrival
of new data at date t. The fraction a;j;k of the variance of the this forecast revision for
variable j, explained by the shock corresponding to vector a in A, is given by
a;j;k =
(ra;j(k))
2Xm
i=1
(ri;j(k))
2
,
where the index j corresponds to variable j.
The key of identifying the shocks of interest lies in the identication of the vector a.
Lemma 3 provides the criterion for eligible candidates of a; Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 allow us
to perform appropriate impulse response analysis and variance decomposition.
The sign restrictions I impose on the shocks are: a positive technology shock leads to
a nonnegative response in both output and corporate net worth; a positive nancial shock,
while leading to a nonnegative response in output, leads to a nonpositive response in corpo-
rate net worth. One may argue that there are many other shocks which could potentially
have such e¤ects on output and net worth, or combination of some fundamental shocks. One
way to avoid this problem would be to identify the other shocks explicitly, but at the cost
of many additional assumptions. Furthermore, this approach is not the only one prone to
such problems; other identication schemes su¤er similar problems. Now let me state the
sign conditions explicitly.
Assumption 1 : Technology shocks correspond to a column vector aT in A such that the
impulse responses of technology shocks of output and net worth are nonnegative at
horizons k = 0; :::; K for some K  0.
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Assumption 2 : Financial shocks correspond to a column vector aF in A such that the
impulse responses of nancial shocks of output are nonnegative while those of net worth
are nonpositive at horizons k = 0; :::; K for some K  0.
Given some VAR coe¢ cient matrices B = [B01; :::; B
0
p], some variance-covariance matrix
, and some parameterK, let T (B;; K) be the set of vector aT which satises Assumption
1. 22 Because it is obtained from inequalities, this set will either be empty or contain many
elements, which makes exact identication impossible. This problem will be solved in two
steps.
As a rst step, it is informative to derive the set T (B;; K) and present the entire
possible range of impulse responses implied by T (B;; K), provided that T (B;; K) is
not empty. Let bB and b be the OLS estimates of the reduced form VAR, and choose a
value for K, there are at least two di¤erent approaches to derive the set T (B;; K) and
the implied range of impulse responses for technology shocks.
The rst approach involves solving a constrained optimization problem. According to
Lemma 4, nding the range of impulse responses is equivalent to nding some vector bT
from the unit sphere such that the implied impulse responses obtain the upper or lower
bound while resulting vector aT satisfying Assumption 1. Note that there is usually no a
single bT such that the response will be at the bound for all variables j or at all horizon k.
Or, this range could be obtained in a brutal force approach by generating many candidates
for bT , calculating their implied impulse response functions, checking the sign restrictions
and deriving the upper and lower bounds. This would give us a consistent, although slightly
biased estimates of the bounds. Specically, draw bT from a standard Normal distribution in
Rm, normalize its length to be 1. Use Lemma 4 to compute the impulse response functions
at all the relevant horizons k = 0; 1; :::; K and check the sign restrictions as specied in As-
sumption 1. Generate a large number of candidate draws for bT and plot the maximum and
minimum of the impulse responses for those aT 2 T (B;; K). Since it is more straight-
forward to implement, this is the approach I adopt in this paper. Results could be seen in
Figure 9. I will defer the discussion of this and all other results in the next subsection.
22All the discussion about T (B;;K) could be applied to F (B;;K) after appropriate adjustment of
the sign conditions. To avoid repetition, I will not discuss the construction of F (B;;K) here.
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As a second step, I adopt a Bayesian approach and supplement the identication as-
sumption A1 by imposing a prior on T (B;; K) in order to tackle the issue of nonexact
identication. Let B = [B1;:::; Bp]0 and assume that the parameters (B;; bT ) are jointly
drawn from a prior on Rpmm  Pmm  Um, where Pmm is the set of all m  m posi-
tive denite matrix and Um is the unit sphere of m dimensional vectors. More specically,
the prior is proportional to a Normal-Wishart distribution in (B;) whenever the resulting
impulse responses from (B;; bT ) satises the sign restrictions, and zero elsewhere. The
at prior on the unit sphere for bT guarantees that reordering the variables and choosing a
di¤erent Cholesky decomposition will not yield di¤erent results.
A proper Normal-Wishart distribution is parameterized by a mean coe¢ cient matrix B
of size mp  m, a positive denite mean covariance matrix S is size m  m, a positive
denite matrix N is size mp  mp and a real number v  0 to describe the uncertainty
about (B;) around (B; S). The Normal-Wishart distribution species that  1 follows a
Wishart distribution Wm(S
 1
=v; v) with E [ 1] = S
 1
, and that the coe¢ cient matrix in
its columnwise vectorized form, vec(B), follows a Normal distribution N(vec(B);
N 1).
Following Uhlig (2005), I use a weak prior such that N0 = 0, v0 = 0, S0 and B0 arbitrary. IfbB and b are the MLE estimates for (B;), the posterior distribution will be such that BT =bB, ST = b, vT = T , NT = X0TXT , where XT = [X1; :::; XT ]0 and Xt = [Y 0t 1; Y 0t 2; :::Y 0t p]0.
To draw inferences from the posterior, I take n1 draws from the Normal-Wishart posterior
distribution and for each of these draws, n2 draws of bT from them dimensional unit sphere.
For each draw, I calculate the impulse responses and check whether the sign restrictions are
satised. If they are, this is a valid draw and is thus kept. Statistics of interest such as error
bands are calculated from all the draws kept. For the computation in this paper, I have
chosen n1 = n2 = 1000.
9.3 Results
In this section, I present some results of identifying nancial and technology shocks using
sign restrictions. Figure 16 shows the range of impulse response functions which satises
the sign restrictions on technology shocks for periods k = 0; 1; :::; K, where K = 10. The
top row contains the results for real GDP and real investment, the middle row contains the
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results for credit ows and net worth, while the bottom row contains the result for credit
spread. In addition to the bounds, three randomly selected impulse responses which satisfy
the sign restrictions are also depicted. Although none of the panels is able to determine the
size of the instantaneous responses for the variables with no sign restrictions imposed, the
potential range of the impulse is indeed greatly shrunk by this exercise. For example, from
the gure it is unlikely that a technology shock will have any signicant impact on credit
spread at 2 years. Figure 17 contains a similar picture for a positive nancial shock. After
about 6 quarters, the e¤ects of nancial shocks are not longer visible.
The benchmark result from Bayesian analysis is contained in Figure 18 and Figure 19,
showing the impulse responses from an expansionary technology shock and an expansionary
nancial shock for K = 10. That is, for the rst 10 period after a positive technology
shock, the responses of output and net worth are required to be positive. According the
results, output, investment and net worth react largely and positively immediately after the
shock, typically rising by 20 to 50 basis points, then reverse course very slowly. The counter
intuitive result is that the credit ows drops initially, although it climbs to a positive level
after about 6 quarters. The results to a positive nancial shock are more standard. Note
that from the top panel, the initial response of GDP to a 100 basis point increase in the
exogenous nancial market is around 10 to 20 basis points, and then starts to decline soon.
What fraction of the variance of the k-step ahead forecast revision in, say, real GDP, or
credit ows, could be explained by technology shocks, or nancial shocks as we dened? The
answer lies in Figure 20 and Figure 21 using Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 respectively
and K = 10. The variables are ordered as in Figure 16. According to the median estimates,
shown as the middle lines in this gure, technology shocks account for about 40 percent
of GDP at its peak horizons, around 5 quarters and 18 quarters. Similar results holds
for investment. Financial shocks accounts to 5 percent of variation in real GDP and real
investment right after its occurrence, however, its e¤ect starts to deteriorate very quickly.
Note that nancial shocks account for more than 20 percent of the forecast variance in net
worth at the very short horizons.
10 Conclusion
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Figure 16: This gure shows the possible range of impulse response functions when imposing the sign
restrictions Assumption1 for K=10 at the OLS point estimate for the VAR.
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Figure 17: This gure shows the possible range of impulse response functions when imposing the sign
restrictions Assumption2 for K=10 at the OLS point estimate for the VAR.
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Figure 18: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock one standard deviation in size, using
Assumpion1 with K=10. The black line is the medium in the posterior distribution, and the error bands
correspond to 25 and 75 percentile respectively.
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Figure 19: Impulse responses to an expansionary nancial shock one standard deviation in sizy, using sign
restrictions Assumpion2 with K=10. The black line is the medium in the posterior distribution, and the
error bands correspond to 25 and 75 percentile respectively.
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Figure 20: These plots show the fraction of the variance of the k-step ahead forecast revision explained by a
technology idendied by imposing Assumption 1. The error bands are 50% error bands around the median.
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Figure 21: These plots show the fraction of the variance of the k-step ahead forecast revision explained by
a nancial shock idendied by imposing Assumption 2. The error bands are 50% error bands around the
median.
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This paper has o¤ered a theory-based approach to identify nancial shocks. By introducing
an exogenous nancial markets into an otherwise standard dynamic general equilibrium
model with nancial accelerator, this paper rst denes a nancial shock as a shock to
banking capital, and then explores its e¤ects on the key variables such as output, investment
and credit ows. Most importantly, although both a positive nancial shock and a positive
technology increase all the variables mentioned above, an expansionary technology shock
tends to increase the entrepreneursnet worth in the model, while an expansionary nancial
shock tends to decrease it. This di¤erence provides the sign conditions needed for the
identication.
With this framework in place, there are potentially more open questions that lie beyond
the scope of this paper. For example, will the sign conditions identied in this paper be
robust across di¤erent model specications? Or, other than using the series of corporate net
worth at historic cost, could we nd a measure of net worthwhich captures the denition
of entrepreneursnet worth in the model as the capital rental income in a better way? These
are all worth pursuing in future research.
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